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Introduction
This paper  compares  unemployment  insurance  (UI)  with unemployment  assistance
(UA)  as alternative  ways to protect workers  against the effects of unemployment.  While  its
scope is intended to be general,  much of the discussion centers on Australia, and, to a lesser
extent,  the  United  States  and  Canada.  The  paper  focuses  on  two  topics:  costs  and  labor
market  disincentives.  It  presents  a  framework  for  assessing  the  costs  of  unemployment
protections and examines comparative data on costs. As will become obvious,  the paper was
written for practical not theoretical  applications.
Two conclusions  are  reached.  1) Even though UA systems  base eligibility on family
income, the  costs of such systems  (per percentage  point of the  unemployment  rate)  are not
necessarily  lower  than  the  costs  of UI  systems.  Examples  of high  cost  and  low  cost  UI
systems are identified as are examples of high cost and low cost UA systems. 2) Each system
has to deal  with  serious  labor market disincentive  issues.  Because  they  are  less  common,
there  has been  less analysis  of disincentive  issues  for UA  systems.  Australia  is the  largest
country with UA, and its system of unemployment protection is examined in some detail.
I.  UI and UA:  Eligibility and Administration
Unemployment  Insurance  (UI)  and  Unemployment  Assistance  (UA)  have  primary
objectives that are  fundamentally  different.  Payments of UI benefits are intended  to smooth
income  by  replacing  a  portion  of  an  eligible  worker's  lost  wages  attributable  to
unemployment.  Payments of UA benefits  are intended to eliminate or reduce poverty among
low  income  families  where  unemployment  occurs.  Thus  while  both  make  payments
'Economist,  The  Urban  Institute.  This  report  was  prepared  under  a  contract  with  the  World  Bank  for
presentation  at  a  World  Bank  seminar  on  Income  Support  Programs  for  the  Unemployed,  June  13,  2000.
Helpful  comments  were  received  from Jocelyn  Pech,  Milan  Vodopivec  and an anonymous  referee.  Opinions
expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the World Bank
or the Urban Institute.occasioned  by unemployment,  UI  goes to persons  as  a matter  of right while  UA is paid to
only  to  families  with  unemployment  whose  income  and  assets  fall  below  the  thresholds
specified by a means test.
Contrasts  between  beneficiaries  of UI  and  UA  are  sharpest  in  situations  where
unemployment  is of short duration.  Recipients of UI can have high income since payments
are  made  to partially  offset the earnings  losses experienced  by the individual regardless  of
total family income.  Because payments of UA, in contrast,  are limited just to families whose
income and assets satisfy a means test, the proportion of benefit payments  that goes towards
poverty reduction is generally higher than for UI payments.
This contrast (UI paid to the  individual worker as a matter of right, UA paid to low
income  families)  becomes  less  clearcut  in  situations  of  long  term  unemployment,  i.e.,
duration  of six  months or longer.  Because  earnings  typically  constitute  the  bulk of family
income,  long  term  unemployment  often  causes  a  large  reduction  in  family income.  Thus
many  of  the  long  term  unemployed  compensated  under  a  UI  program  would  also  be
compensated  under a means tested UA program.  Payments from both programs have similar
poverty-reducing effects in such situations (until UI is exhausted).
From  a  macro  perspective,  UI  and  UA  both  make  cash  payments  that  respond
strongly to cyclical developments.  Both undertake  activities of payments administration, e.g.,
decisions  about  eligibility  and  payment  levels,  and  these  activities  are  often  similar.
Internationally,  UI is by far the more common of the two.  This paper examines the costs of
UA systems  in four countries  (Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and  Estonia) which are
the main UA systems at the present time.
A brief comment about the classification  of unemployment  protection  systems  may
be appropriate.  In  several  counties  UI and  UA both are  present with UI  available  first for
persons  who  qualify  and  UA then available  for UI  exhaustees  and/or  UA  is  available  for
those who do not qualify for UI.  When both are present, periodic UA payments are typically
lower  than  UI  payments.  Some  countries  also  have  a  third  tier  of protection  for  the
unemployed,  an income-conditioned  social  assistance  program  with  benefits  payable  after
UA entitlements  have been exhausted. Gornick (1999) describes the types of unemployment




Requirements on the claimant
1. Total or substantial unemployment  X  X
2. Substantial prior work experience  X
3. Acceptable  reason for separation  X
4. Serve a waiting period  X  X
5. Low family  income  (and assets)  X
Administrative agency determinations
1. Initial Entitlement,  Yes-No  X  X
2. Level of periodic payment  X  X
3. Maximum potential duration  X
4. Family Income  Assessment  X
Continuing Eligibility
Requirements on the claimant
1. Able to work  X  X
2. Available  to work  X  X
3. Active  work search  X  X
4. Low family  income  (and assets)  X
Administrative agency  oversight
1.  Work search  X  X
2. Suitable job offers  X  X
3. Disqualift'ing  and/or deductable  X
labor income,  e.g.,  pensions
4. Family income  monitoring  X
protections  offered in OECD countries.  Section  1 of Schmid  and Reissert  (1996) provides a
concise summary of UI and UA classification issues.
For this paper,  "mixed" systems where UI is the initial port of entry for claimants  are
treated  as  UI  systems.  The  paper  is  restricted  to  a  comparison  of UI  (including  mixed
systems) with stand-alone  UA as an alternative program for the unemployed.
Table  I  summarizes  UI  and  UA  activities  in  two  broad  areas  of  benefits
administration:  initial  entry  and  continuing  eligibility.  For both  areas,  the  table  lists  the
requirements the claimant must satisfy and the decisions (determinations)  made by program
administrators.  The table  compares  stylized  UI  and  UA programs.  If actual  countries  were
identified,  a more  varied  picture  would be  observed.  Specific  eligibility  requirements  and
3administrative  activities  are  identified  with  X's.  Several  rows  have  X's  for  both
unemployment  protections.  Key  differences  between UI  and UA are identified  in the rows
where only a single X is present.
Both  protections  make  payments  for  partial  unemployment  as  well  as  total
unemployment,'  and both specify  an explicit waiting period between  filing for benefits  and
receiving an initial payment.  However, UI requires the claimant to have substantial previous
work  (signaled  by  a required  threshold  level  of previous  earnings  (USA),  weeks  worked
(Germany) or hours  worked  (Canada))  whereas  UA can compensate those  with little or no
previous  work experience.  The reason  for the job  separation  is  important  for UI  eligibility
while  UA  eligibility  determinations  focus  heavily  on  family  income  and  assets.  Both
programs  make  yes-no  decisions  about  initial  eligibility  and  the  level  of the  periodic
payment,  but only  UI  specifies  potential  benefit  duration  at  the  time  of initial  entry  into
benefit status.  A UA program may or may not limit potential  duration.  Potential  duration is
unlimited  in Australia,  but in  Germany  UA  duration  for  many  (all  but  UI  exhaustees)  is
limited.
To  continue  in benefit  status,  the  claimant  must be  able  to work  and available  for
work. Increasingly  countries  are requiring evidence  of active work search as well. The  latter
requirement  has  various  names,  e.g.,  activation,  reciprocal  obligation  or mutual  obligation.
While  country practices  regarding  activation  vary widely,  merely waiting until a "suitable"
job  is  offered  is  generally  becoming  less  acceptable  for  maintaining  continuing  benefit
eligibility.  Enforcing  work  search  requirements,  judging  the  suitability  of job  offers  and
monitoring job refusals  are administrative  tasks common to UI and UA. Both programs  also
monitor the receipt of other income that may reduce entitlements.  In UI, the other income is
typically linked to previous work, e.g., severance  pay and pension benefits. In contrast, all of
family  income  is  considered  in  administering  the  means  test  for  UA.  Monitoring  family
income is not simple,  especially if a spouse works. If income  monitoring is effective,  changes
in the spouse's earnings will alter the UA payment.
' Partial  unemployment  is  usually  more  prevalent  in UA  programs  but  some  paid work  while  in  receipt  of
benefits is  permitted by both UI and UA.
4As  noted,  many countries  offer  both  UI and UA  with the  latter available  after the
claimant exhausts UI and/or for those not eligible for UI at the onset of unemployment.2 In
these situations, the contrasts  between UI and UA are smaller than suggested  by Table  1. In
effect,  UI acts  as a screen  for some workers  who later move into UA benefit  status, but the
transition to UA  is  made by  only  some  of the long term  unemployed,  i.e., those  with low
income. Typically those who move from UI to UA are paid a lower periodic benefit while on
UA.
A priori, UI and UA would be expected to have contrasting patterns of administrative
costs.  Of  the  two,  UI  pays  more  attention  to  the  claimant's  work  history  and  to  the
circumstances  of the job  separation,  since  entitlement  presumes  a  lengthy period of prior
employment and an acceptable reason for the job separation.3 UA, on the other hand, focuses
more  on  the  current  fact  of unemployment  and whether  or not  the  claimant  satisfies  the
means  test.  While  UI will  review  certain  types  of income  for possible  offsets  against  UI
payments  (severance  pay and pension benefits),  UA has to make  a complete  assessment  of
income.  Also, changes  in income,  e.g.,  the  earnings  of a spouse,  need to  be monitored  to
verify continuing  UA eligibility.  Both have  to monitor job  search  and  work availability  as
conditions for continuing eligibility.
Of the two systems,  administrative  costs would usually be higher under UA because
of the costs  of monitoring  income  (initial income  assessments  for new claims  and  income
monitoring  for ongoing  claims).  These  costs would  typically  exceed  the costs  of UI  initial
eligibility  determinations  which  are  one-time  costs  per  claim.  The  costs  of monitoring
availability  and  work  search  are  likely  to  be  similar  in  the  two  systems.  While  the
administrative  costs  of UA  are  likely  to  be  higher,  no  comparative  cost  data  have  been
assembled to provide  empirical  support for this inference.  This important issue would be an
appropriate topic for a separate inquiry.
2 See, for example,  Charts 4.1-4.5  in Chapter 4 of OECD (1998). Tables  I and 2 in Gornick (1999) show that of
the  18  OECD  countries  with  UI  programs  as  of the mid  1990s,  nine  also  had UA.  The  nine  were  Austria,
Finland, France, Germany,  Ireland, the Netherlands,  Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3 If a claimant quits a job there will usually be both an investigation  of the reason for the quit and assessment of
a quit penalty that precludes receipt of benefits for a number of  weeks.
5II.  Disincentive  Issues
The  two  forms  of unemployment  protection  generate  problems  of labor  market
disincentives.  However, the disincentive problems in the two systems are different.
Unemployment Insurance.
For  unemployment  insurance  three  disincentives  can  be  identified.  First,  there  are
entry  incentive  effects.  When  the  recipient  work  histories  are  studied,  a  bunching  of
claimants who satisfy minimum eligibility requirement is often found. Prior to 1997, Canada
based eligibility  on previous  weeks of employment.  Each year a bunching  was observed  at
the minimum weeks threshold.  Canada now uses hours worked to deternine eligibility (from
420 to 700 depending on provincial  unemployment),  and a bunching  at the minimum hours
threshold is observed.  The presence  of a minimum eligibility threshold causes some to work
more, some to work less and the net effect is not clear.
Second,  there  may  be high replacement  rates,  i.e.,  high ratios of weekly benefits to
weekly earnings. High replacement  rates  encourage  longer  spells in benefit status.  Some of
the added time is spent in job search and some in subsidized leisure.  Research has not shown
positive  effects  of  prolonged  search  on  wages  and/or  hours  worked  at  reemployment.
Estimates of the size of replacement  rate effects differ, but the direction of the effect is clear.
As  claimants  suffer  a  smaller  income  loss  from  unemployment  (higher  replacement  rate),
they prolong periods of recipiency.
At least three  factors  that contribute to high replacement rates can be singled out.  1)
Progressive  benefit  formulas  provide  for  higher  replacement  among  workers  paid  low
wages.4 2) Workers subject to high marginal  income tax rates often experience high net wage
loss  replacement.  3)  Paying  dependents'  allowances  increases  replacement  rates.  A
compounding  of these  factors  occurs  among  secondary  workers  with  children  who  are
members of high income families.
Third,  long potential  benefit  duration  can  contribute  to  increases  in  actual  benefit
duration.  While empirical  estimates  vary,  each added week of potential duration  adds from
4  In California,  the  weekly benefit  for beneficiaries  at the minimum  is 65 percent of the average  weekly  wage
while for high wage workers the replacement rate is 39 percent.
60.1  to  0.2  weeks  to  actual  duration  (studies  from  the  United  States).5 Larger  effects  of
potential  duration  on  actual  duration  may  obtain  in  economies  where  exhaustion  of UI
benefits may be followed by receipt of UA benefits, e.g., Germany.
Unemployment duration has many determinants besides UI potential benefit duration.
An  increased  pace  of dislocation  and  permanent  job  loss  has  probably  played  a role  in
increased unemployment  duration  in the U.S..  Over the past two decades,  several measures
suggest that average unemployment  duration has increased relative to earlier decades. In data
from the  monthly household  labor force  survey,  median and mean  duration (of incomplete
spells) between the  1970s and 1990s both increased by more than 20 percent even though the
average  unemployment  rate  was  higher  in the  1970s.  Data from UI  programs  in the  U.S.
show a lengthened duration in benefit status. The mean in UI data has been higher by about
one week  in the  1990s  compared  to  the  1970s,  and  the  benefit  exhaustion  rate  has  been
higher by six to seven percentage points.6
The increase  in unemployment duration  in the U.S. during  the  1980s and  1990s has
occurred  in  a  period  when  UI  benefit  generosity  has,  if  anything,  declined.  Average
replacement  rates are now  somewhat lower than in the late  1970s (details vary from state to
state) while potential  benefit duration  has  not increased.  These time  series patterns  suggest
that  developments  in  unemployment  duration  in  the  U.S.  have  not  been  driven  by
developments  in UI statutory provisions.
An  important  component  of increased  unemployment  in  Western  Europe  since  the
early  1970s  has  been  a  lengthening  of  unemployment  duration.  Several  studies  have
examined the linkage  between increased duration and the provisions  of the UI systems  (and
other aspects  of employment  security)  in these  countries.  Since  long UI potential  duration
usually predated  the  increase  in unemployment  of the  mid-1970s,  the  linkage  between  UI
provisions and increased duration is not transparent.  A recent investigation by Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) argues that an interaction between institutions, e.g., unemployment protection
5  Summaries  of the  U.S.  empirical  literature  are  given  in  Woodbury  and  Rubin  (1997)  and  Vroman  and
Woodbury  (1996).  Katz and  Meyer  (1990)  provide  estimates  of the  effects  of potential  on  actual  duration.
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991)  and Ham,  Svejnar and Terrell (1998) summarize  international evidence.  See
also the analysis of determining social assistance  support levels in Chapter 3 in  OECD (1998).
6  See Chapter IV of Vroman (2001)  for a summary of trends  in unemployment  duration in the U.S. from  1950
through  1999.
7provisions  such  as  the  replacement  rate  and  the  maximum  potential  benefit  duration,  and
macroeconomic  shocks have combined  to produce the higher unemployment  and lengthened
duration  observed in many countries  since the mid 1970s.  Many researchers have found an
effect of UI provisions on unemployment duration and additional research on the linkage can
be anticipated.
Unemployment Assistance.
Because  UA  conditions  eligibility  on  the  family  income  of  the  unemployed
individual, the static  labor supply-income framework provides a useful point of departure  for
a discussion of disincentives. For a given family member, family income is given by:
(II-1)Y=X  +W*H  where,
Y = family income,
X = income from assets plus the earnings of all other family members,
W = the person's wage rate and
H = hours of work.
When family income  falls below  Y*, the income  guarantee, UA is paid to the family.7 Five
aspects  of the payment  are  noteworthy.  1) The guarantee  (Y*)  may depend  (positively)  on
family size.  Thus  for a given  level of Y, larger families receive  larger payments.  2)  Ceteris
paribus, a low wage  rate will cause the  UA payment to be  larger. Low  wage workers  with
both hours  of unemployment  and hours of employment,  could  receive  a UA payment  even
with  substantial  hours  worked.  3)  Ceteris paribus, low  hours  worked  will  cause  UA
payments  to  be  larger.  Points  2)  and  3)  taken  together  imply  that  a  large  share  of UA
recipients could be working  and receiving payments simultaneously.8 4) Ceteris  paribus, the
largest payments are received by persons with zero  earnings. If the guarantee level  is set too
high in an environment  where people have substantial  control over their unemployment, UA
could encourage a lengthening of unemployment duration.
7The asset test for UA eligibility is not explicitly treated in the present discussion.
s Evidence from Australia,  Hong Kong and New Zealand, three  countries with UA systems, supports this point.
In  both  Australia  and  New  Zealand  some  12  to  20  percent  of UA  recipients  have  earnings.  Hong  Kong
compensates  low wage workers through a program separate  from  its UA program. The number with low wages
who receive  a assistance  have totaled  about 20  percent  of the combined  total for recipients  of UA plus  low
wage  assistance.  In  Honk  Kong,  it is  not known  how may  recipients  of low wage  assistance  are working  at
shorter than preferred hours,  i.e., experiencing partial unemployment.
85)  Payment  of UA  benefits  to an  unemployed  family  member  can influence  labor  supply
decisions of other family  members. Wives  with unemployed husbands,  for example, may be
less likely to work since their earnings could either make the family totally ineligible for UA
or reduce the size of the payment.  Concern  over this possible  effect on family labor supply
motivated  changes  in  Australia's  UA  system  in  the  mid-1990s.  Part  of the  reason  for
Australia  changing  to  a  more  individualized  UA  system  in  1995  was  to  encourage  work
among  other  persons  in  families  (often  wives)  where  one  member  is  unemployed.  These
changes are discussed in Section VII.
Empirical  evidence  supports the presumption of a labor supply effect on other family
members.  Section  F  in a survey  article by Atkinson  and Micklewright  (1991)  summarizes
research  from  the  1980s  based  mainly  on  studies  in  the United  Kingdom  and  Germany.
Wives of unemployed  men receiving UA benefits  exhibit systematically  lower participation
rates than other wives.  This evidence goes  counter to the common presumption of an added
worker  effect,  i.e.,  increased  labor  force  participation,  among  wives  of the  unemployed.
Giannelli  and  Micklewright  (1995)  note  presumptive  evidence  in  participation  rate
differences  across  several  OECD countries  and undertake a more  detailed analysis  of micro
data  from  Germany.  They find that UA benefits  play  an important  part in explaining  low
participation  rates among German wives.  Terrell, Lubyova and Strapec (1996) found that the
presence  of an  unemployed  spouse  lowered  the  hazard  rate  of exit  to employment  by  72
percent for woman and 82 percent for men  in an analysis of data from the Czech Republic.
Boeri (1997) reports similar findings in data from Poland.
Brief consideration of these five points suggests that serious disincentive  issues could
arise  within UA programs.  To minimize  artificial prolongation  of unemployment,  the work
search activity of UA recipients needs to be actively monitored.
Another disincentive  issue could arise from worker-initiated job turnover,  i.e.,  quits.
Quit-to-unemployment  flows  cause  family  income  to  decline.  Thus  the  reason  for
unemployment  may  have  to  be  monitored  by  a  UA  program  and  entitlement  limited  to
"acceptable"  reasons for unemployment.
Youth unemployment  may also present problems for a UA program.  If new workers
can collect UA without demonstrating  a substantial job history, some youth might appear as
9unemployed for purposes of collecting UA when they are not seriously searching for work or
engaged  in  training.  Again,  this  would  present  a  monitoring  problem  for  UA  program
administrators.
Because  UA programs  occur with much  less frequency  than UI programs, there has
been less  research  on disincentive  problems  in UA.  However,  another body of literature  is
relevant,  analyses  of  the  work  disincentives  of  welfare  programs.  That  research  has
emphasized  high effective marginal  tax rates9 and poverty traps as  impediments to work by
the  welfare  population.  Recent  policy  initiatives  in the  U.S.  have  made  mandatory  work
requirements  a prominent  feature of a "reformed" welfare  system. At a minimum, advocates
of UA as a less costly program than UI would have to present  cogent responses to questions
about  disincentive  effects  in  a  program  that  conditions  eligibility  upon  family  income.
Section  VII  revisits  UA  disincentive  questions  in  the  context  of the  Australian  system  of
unemployment protection.
III.  The Cost of Unemployment  Protection
Payments  of unemployment  protection  benefits  can  be  compared  across  countries
using  a  common  metric.  This  paper  examines  benefit  payments  as  a  percentage  of total
wages. It first derives a framework and then examines costs for selected countries in Sections
IV, V and VI.
Benefit payments to the unemployed can be expressed  as:
(III-1) TBen = AWBen*NBen*52 where,
TBen = total annual benefit payments,
AWBen = average weekly benefits,
NBen = the average  weekly number of beneficiaries  and  52 converts  weekly  benefit
payments to an annual benefit flow.
The right hand terms in (III-1) can be rewritten equivalently  as:
(III-1 a) TBen = (RRate*AWW)*((NBen/Unemp)*(LF*URate))*52  where
AWW = the average weekly wage,
RRate = the replacement  rate (average weekly benefits as a ratio to AWW),
9 High effective  marginal  tax rates arise  from three  sources:  1) the phase-out rate of UA benefits  when family
income  exceeds the maximum  allowed  for the receipt of full UA benefits,  2) the marginal  payroll tax rate on
earnings  and 3) the marginal  income tax rate for the recipient's  family income. A  review of the U.S.  literature,
prior to welfare  reform of 1996, is given by Moffitt (1992).
10Unemp = average weekly number unemployed,
LF = the labor force and
URate  = the unemployment  rate  (unemployment  as  a proportion  of the labor  force,
also commonly termed the TUR, shorthand for the total unemployment rate).
Note  that the replacement  rate  in (III-1 a)  measures  benefit payments  relative  to the
economy-wide  average weekly wage.  Since the incidence  of unemployment is higher among
low skilled workers, the average weekly wage of beneficiaries will be lower than the overall
average  weekly wage.  Thus RRate  in (III-la) could be expressed  as the replacement  rate for
beneficiaries  times the ratio  of their weekly wage to the overall weekly wage.  In U.S.  data,
the  weekly  wage  of UI  beneficiaries  ranges  from  80  to  90  percent  of the  overall  weekly
wage.  This  alternative  representation  would  have  the  advantage  of  showing  an  average
replacement rate more directly relevant to labor supply decisions of beneficiaries.
A convenient  metric for examining  the costs of unemployment  benefit protections  is
annual wage and salary payments.  This can be expressed as:
(III-2) Wages = Emp*AWW*52  where,
Wages = total annual wages or the wage bill,
Emp = annual average employment and
AWW = the average weekly wage.
This expression for the annual wage bill can be rewritten as:
(III-2a) Wages = LF*(1  - URate)*AWW*52  where the terms in (III-2a) have already
been introduced.
Dividing  (III-l a)  by  (III-2a)  yields  an  expression  for unemployment  benefit  costs
measured as a fraction of the wage bill:
(III-3) TBen/Wages = RRate*(NBen/Unemp)*URate/(1  - URate).
This  benefit  cost  rate  can  be  expressed  as  a fraction  or  as  a percentage.  In the  graphical
exposition of Section IV below, B (= TBen/Wages) is shown as a percentage.
The  left  hand  side  of  expression  (III-3)  is  the  cost  of unemployment  benefits
expressed  as a fraction (or percentage) of the wage bill. This cost rate has three determinants:
1)  the  replacement  rate,  2)  the  share  of the  unemployed  who are  compensated  and  3)  the
unemployment  rate.  The  latter  is  largely  a  macro  phenomenon  that  reflects  the  overall
functioning  of the  economy.  The replacement  rate  and  the  share  who  receive  benefits,  in
contrast,  are  influenced  by  policy  choices  made  by  a  country.  Statutory  provisions  and
I1administrative  procedures  influence  both  payment  levels  and  the  share of the unemployed
who receive  benefits.
Up  to  this  point,  note  that  the  discussion  of unemployment  benefit  costs  has  not
distinguished  UI  from  UA payments.  Regardless  of the  kind  of unemployment  protection
offered by a country, total payments can be represented as in expression (III-3).  Because the
expression  is  generic,  it  can  be helpful  in  making  comparisons  between  UI  and  UA and
showing the cost of each relative to the total wage bill.
One  other  feature  of  expression  (III-3)  should  also  be  pointed  out.  The  ratio
(NBenlUnemp)  is a summary measure of benefit availability,  but NBen is not nested within
Unemp.  Since both UI and UA can make payments  to persons with earnings, NBen is not a
subset of Unemp.  In the United States, for example,  almost 10 percent of weeks compensated
by  the  UI  program  goes  to  persons  with  eamings  who  receive  a  so-called  partial
unemployment benefit.  In Australia,  nearly one fifth of UA recipients  have earnings  in the
same  period  when  benefits  are being  received,  and,  as  will  be  seen, NBen  has  exceeded
Unemp in some  years.  Thus the (NBen/Unemp)  ratio is best thought of as a macro indicator
of benefit availability where some recipients may be employed. 10
In  providing  unemployment  protections,  a  country  may  make  explicit  or implicit
decisions regarding the replacement rate and the share of the unemployed to be compensated.
The product of RRate  and (NBen/Unemp)  determines how costly unemployment  protection
is per percentage  point in the  unemployment  rate.  This product can be termed  a generosity
index (G). i.e., G = RRate*(NBen/Unemp).
Several combinations of RRate  and (NBen/Unemp)  can combine to yield  a given G.
For example,  a G of 0.25 can arise when both RRate  and (NBen/Unemp)  equal 0.50 or when
RRate equals  0.25  while (NBenlUnemp)  equals  1.00. Countries  have wide choice in setting
the two  components  that combine  to determine  G. Thus the U.K.  and the U.S.  have  similar
levels  of G  (See  Chart  A  in  Section  IV)  but  RRate  is  much  higher  in  the  U.S  while
(NBenlUnemp)  is  much  higher  in the  U.K..  If a  country  wanted  to  make  a cost-neutral
'° The usual convention in labor force surveys  is to count people as unemployed  only if they have been  looking
for work but had no hours worked  during the reference  week.  In other words,  people with both  hours worked
and hours of unemployment during the reference  week are counted as employed.  Persons in these situations are
described  as  underemployed.  Note  that  underemployment  is  a  broader  concept  that  can  also  be  applied  to
persons working  full time but at a skill level below that for which they were trained.
12change  in its  unemployment  program,  this could  be accomplished  by changing  RRate  but
modifying (NBenlUnemp) in the opposite direction.
Chart A.  Benefit Costs,  Benefit Generosity  and Unemployment  Rates in Selected  OECD
Countries,  1992
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Adj. R2 = -0.02
Regardless  of the  system  used to  provide  unemployment  protection,  UI  or UA, the
costs of benefit payments  per percentage  point of unemployment  can be characterized  with
G,  the  generosity  index.  Empirical  examples  from  UI  systems  are  explored  in Section  IV
while examples from UA systems are examined in Section VI.
The coefficient  G  also has  macroeconomic  significance.  It  is a gradient  that shows
how  much  the  cost  of unemployment  protections  increases  when  the  unemployment  rate
changes.  Individual  countries may select a smaller  or larger G depending upon factors such
13as affordability  and the size of perceived disincentive  effects. As will be seen in Sections IV
and VI, a wide variety of choices have, in fact, been made.
IV.  Some Empirical Examples
To  make the  preceding  discussion  more  concrete,  this  section  displays  graphs that
illustrate  the  costs  of unemployment  protections.  The  emphasis  is  on  the  costs  of  UI
programs. All charts plot benefits as a percent of wages against the unemployment rate.
Twelve Countries in 1992.
Chart A  displays  data  from twelve  countries  in  1992.  The  data are derived  from  a
study by  Schmid  and  Reissert  (1996)."  Their analysis  combined UI  and UA payments  in
countries  like  France  and  Germany  where  both  protections  are  present.  The  constituent
elements  of G, i.e.,  RRate  and (NBen/Unemp),  are  also  examined in their  analysis, but are
not emphasized here.
Three  factors  stand  out  in Chart  A.  1) Costs and  unemployment  rates vary widely
across the twelve countries.  Three countries  have cost rates  (B%) that exceed  3.5 percent of
wages  while  two  have  cost  rates  below  0.5  percent  of wages.  2)  Of the  high  income
countries, the U.S.  and the U.K. rank near the bottom in terms of absolute cost levels  (B%)
and both are low in terms of G, the generosity  index. The average  gradient linking B% to the
unemployment  rate  across  the twelve  countries  is roughly 0.20-0.25  while the gradients  in
the  U.S  and  the  U.K.  are  closer  to  0.10.  Third,  and  probably most  surprising,  there  is  no
association between  the unemployment rate and  costs (B%)  for these twelve  countries.  The
adjusted  R2 in  a homogeneous  regression  across  the twelve  is -0.02.12  In  1992 variation  in
replacement  rates and the share of the unemployed who were compensated were so wide that
they  overwhelmed  the  association that would be expected  between the  unemployment rate
and the cost of providing unemployment  protections.
The  variation  across  countries  is  startling.  Arrays  from  the  origin  for  Sweden  and
Denmark suggest values  of G of 0.697  and 0.506 respectively.  The corresponding  estimate
"  Their  paper expresses  unemployment  benefit  costs as a percent  of GDP. These  have  been converted  to an
estimated percent of wages by assuming wages represent 70 percent of GDP.
12  The regressions shown at the bottom of all charts follow equation I11-3  of the text. TUR is shorthand  for the
unemployment  rate. Similar results obtain when the unemployment rate enters linearly.
14for Greece  is 0.032.  The slope of the highest gradient  (Sweden) exceeds  that of the lowest
gradient (Greece) by a factor of about 22.
US. States in 1997.
The  UI program  in the U.S. is  administered  by  individual  states that determine  the
key  benefit  provisions.  While  there  is  federal  (national)  oversight  of state  activities,  the
federal  performance  standards  relate  primarily  to  the  timeliness  of  administrative
determinations.  There  are  no  federal  standards  affecting  benefit  provisions  such  as  the
minimum  benefit,  maximum  benefit  or the  statutory  replacement  rate.  As  a consequence,
Chart B. Benefit Costs, Benefit Generosity and Unemployment  Rates in  the  U.S and in
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benefit generosity varies widely across individual states.
Chart B provides a snapshot of UI costs across the states in 1997. Data are shown for
just eleven states from among the  53 programs.'3 Included states were selected to display the
3 Programs  are present in fifty states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
15two with  the  lowest  unemployment  rates  (North  Dakota  and Nebraska),  the two  with the
highest unemployment  rates (Alaska and the District of Columbia)  as well as the states with
the highest and lowest G's. In  1997, only three states (Alaska, Hawaii  and Rhode Island) had
UI benefit costs that exceeded  1.00 percent of wages.  Several states had costs that fell below
0.25 percent of wages.
Benefit generosity  as indicated  by the coefficient G is highly varied  in the U.S.. The
gradient  G that links the unemployment rate to the benefit cost rate was highest in states like
Rhode  Island,  Washington,  Wisconsin, Alaska and North  Dakota  (slopes of roughly  0.18-
0.20)  while  those  with  the lowest  benefit  cost  gradients  include  Louisiana,  Virginia  and
Arizona (slopes  of roughly 0.04-0.06).  From the most generous to the least generous  states,
the incremental  cost of UI benefits  per percentage  point of unemployment  rate displayed  a
range  of more  than  four  to  one.  When  the  sources  interstate  variation  in  UI  costs  are
examined,  variation  in the  share  of the  unemployed  who  are compensated  is  much  more
important than variation in the replacement rate.1 4
Across  51  state  UI  programs  underlying  Chart  B,  the  average  1997  value  for  the
coefficient  G  as  determined  by  a regression  was  0.103,  less than  half the  twelve  country
average  as displayed  earlier in Chart A.  Chart B provides  support for the earlier observation
that the UI program in the U.S. has much lower costs per percentage  point of unemployment
than the average for the OECD countries as shown in Chart A.
The Evolution of UI Costs in the U.S..
Chart C summarizes the evolution of UI costs in the U.S. between  1957 and 1998. For
the  full  42  years,  the  gradient  linking  benefits  as  a  percent  of  wages  (B%)  to  the
unemployment rate  as determined by a regression  was 0.103.  For the two  sub-periods  1957-
1980 and 1981-1998, however, the slopes were 0.123 and 0.098 respectively.
Chart  C  distinguishes  the  data  points  from the  two  sub-periods:  Xs  for the  earlier
vears (to 1980) and Rs for the later years. The predominance of Rs towards the bottom of the
envelope  of data points  is  apparent.  A formal  test  for equality of coefficients  for the  two
14 Relative  variability can be summarized with a coefficient of variation  (CV), the ratio of  the standard deviation
to the mean of a variable.  Across 51  states  in 1997 the CV for the replacement  rate was 0.150 whereas  the CV
for the ratio of UI beneficiaries to unemployment was 0.337.
16periods was rejected at the 0.01  level. Literature  on recipiency in the U.S., e.g.,  Burtless and
Saks (1985),  Corson  and Nicholson  (1988)  and Vroman  (1991),  has  consistently  shown  a
decrease  in  recipiency  in  the  early  1980s.  Chart  C  shows  that  decreased  recipiency  is
reflected in UI costs as well.
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The Evolution of UI Costs in Canada
Canada's UI program has undergone  several major changes since the  1970s that have
affected costs. In the early  1970s the program  was liberalized,  including a major increase  in
benefit levels.  The changes persisted throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, a period when the
Canadian unemployment  rate increased  noticeably relative to the rate in the U.S..  During the
1990s,  in  contrast,  Canada  enacted  a  variety  of reforms  that  have  reduced  in  both  the
replacement  rate  and  recipiency.  Two  analyses  of the  changes  in  Canada's  program  are
provided by Sargent (1998) and Lin (1998).
17The effects  of the changes  on UI costs are  apparent  in Chart  D which  spans the 42
years from  1957 to 1998.15  Three  sub-periods  are  distinguished:  1957-1971,  1972-1991  and
1992-1998.  Data points  from  1972-1991  (Hs)  generally  fall  towards  the  top of the  data
cluster  while  those  from  1992-1998  (Rs)  generally  fall  below  the  cluster.  Systematic
contrasts in costs for each sub-period are shown by the slopes of the relationship  between the
unemployment rate and the benefit cost rate (B%). Between  1957 and  1971  the average  slope
was  0.272.  The  slope  increased  to  0.301  between  1972  and  1991  and  then  fell  to  0.224
between  1992 and 1998.
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During  the  1990s  Canada  instituted  several  changes  to  restrict  UI  eligibility  and
weekly benefits.  Statutory replacement  rates were  lowered (for quitters in 1990 and the basic
replacement  rate  was  reduced  from  60  to  57  percent in  1993,  to  55  percent in  1994  and
further reduced  in  1996),  disqualifications  for quits were  increased  (to a fixed  12  weeks  in
15  In  some  instances  unemployed  persons  may  also  receive  income-conditioned  payments  from  the  social
assistance  programs  administered  by Canadian  provinces.  Barrett and Craig (1998).  Their  analysis for  British
Columbia in 1  9XX suggests that SA to the unemployed adds about Y percent to recipiency.
181990  and  an  indefinite  disqualification  in  1993),  entry  requirements  were  raised  (from  8
weeks to  10 in 1990, to 12 in 1994 and then hours-based eligibility in 1997), potential benefit
duration  was  reduced  (in  1990,  1994  and  1996)  and  a system of person-based  experience
rating  was  instituted.'6 On  balance,  the  changes  have  reduced  recipiency  more  than  the
replacement  rate.  At the  start of the  1990s,  the (NBen/Unemp)  ratio  fell  into the 0.70-0.80
range but during  1994-1998 it averaged 0.43.
Even with the recent restrictions  in Canadian Ul, note that the regression line for the
1990s  has  a slope  that  is slightly higher than the  slope  reported  in Chart A,  0.224 versus
0.197.  Thus  the  U.S.  and  Canada  present  vivid  contrasts  regarding  the costs  of their  Ul
programs.  Even  after  Canada's  enactment of major  restrictions  in the  1990s,  its program
continues to be more than twice as expensive as the U.S. program per percentage  point in the
unemployment rate.
V.  The Cost of Unemployment  Assistance  in Australia
Australia  has administered  a program of unemployment  assistance  (UA) for over 50
years.  Of the  countries  where  UA  is  the  primary  program  for  unemployment  protection,
Australia is the largest.'7 Its UA program has undergone  several changes and continues to be
subject to periodic modifications.
Australia  provides  a full  set of social  protections  through  pensions,  allowances  and
other kinds  of support.18 As  a rule, pension payments  are larger than  allowances.  Over the
past two  decades,  age  pensions  and  UA  allowances  respectively  have  averaged  about  25
percent and 20 percent of the average male wage.  Age pensions, the largest of the individual
programs,  are received by over 80 percent of those aged 65 and older.  Traditionally, pensions
have been provided  as federally-supported  payments.  In the future, public pensions are to be
supplemented  by  superannuation  payments  from  individual  accounts  financed  through
16  See Table  1  in Sargent (1998).
'' Four countries that offer UA as the primary unemployment protection program  are (in descending  size,  i.e.,
1996  population  in  millions):  Australia  (18),  Hong  Kong (6),  New Zealand  (4)  and  Estonia  (1).  Except for
Estonia, the others are high income countries (1996 per capita GDP above US$16,000).
I' Table I in Whiteford  (2000) lists five  kinds of pensions  (age, disability  support, wife of pensioner,  carer and
parenting  payments),  eight kinds  of allowances  (newstart  (for unemployment),  partner,  parenting  payment,
youth allowance widow,  newstart  (short term sickness),  mature  age  and special  benefits), two  kinds of "other
programs"  (child care  assistance  and  public  housing)  and  eleven  kinds  of family payments,  allowances  and
supplements.
19payroll-based  mandatory employer  contributions  and voluntary  employee contributions.  For
persons  of working  age,  there  are  invalidity (permanent disability) payments,  payments  for
short  term  sickness  and  work  injuries,  mature  age  (pre-retirement)  allowances,  parenting
allowances,  support payments for training and higher education and rental subsidies.
The  philosophy  behind  the  social  protection  programs  is to  provide  means  tested
benefits.  Except  for  the  superannuation  scheme  (a comparatively  recent  innovation)  and
workers'  compensation,  the  other  programs  condition  payments  on  the  levels  of family
income and family assets (exempting family residences that are owned). Because of its heavy
reliance on means testing, Australia is unique within OECD countries  in targeting payments
to the low income families  and individuals.  Roughly 60 percent of cash benefits  are  paid to
those in the bottom three deciles of the income distribution. 19
Also unusual is Australia's  reliance  on general  revenues to finance  social payments.
Most  OECD  countries  rely  mainly  on payroll  taxes.  Because  most payments  are  income-
conditioned  in  Australia,  issues  arise  in  structuring  payments  so  that work  incentives  are
appropriate.  Effective  marginal  tax  rates  are  often  high  for individuals  who  contemplate
working more to increase their earnings and income.20
During  the  past  40  years  certain  evolutionary  changes  have  occurred  in  Australia
leading  to heightened concerns  about family income disparities,  labor market outcomes  and
the  structure  of the  social  protection  system.  Five  developments  have  been  particularly
noteworthy.  1) Among  two  parent  families,  there has  been  sizeable  reduction  in the share
with one working adult and  simultaneous  growth in the share with two adult earners and the
share with  zero  adult  earners.  Growth  of the latter  group has prompted  a public discussion
about  "work-poor"  families  and the  exclusion  of some  from  the economic  mainstream.  2)
Much of the growth  in  employment has been in part-time jobs.  Roughly  one job in four is
part-time  with about 40 percent  of women working part-time.  3)  Economic recoveries  have
been  characterized  by  stickiness  in  unemployment.  Unemployment  rates  have  declined
'9 Comparative  data  for  13  OECD  countries  in 1995  show the overall  share of transfers  going to the bottom
three deciles  ranged from 20.8 percent  in Italy to Australia's  58.0 percent with the second  highest percentage
being 53.5  percent in  France. Conversely the top three deciles in  Australia received  7.4 percent of transfers, the
lowest percentage across the same 13 countries.  See Figures 7 and 8 in Whiteford (2000).
20  Clear discussions of effective marginal tax rates in Australia are provided in Appendix 4 of Interim Report of
the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000) and in Section 2.4 in Whiteford (2000).
20during  recoveries  but  never  to  levels  experienced  prior  to  1975.  4)  There  has  been  a
noticeable  growth  in the  share  of the  working  age  adult population  (ages  15  to  64)  who
receive income support payments.  The percentage was about  5 percent in the late 1960s, but
has varied between 20 to 24 percent  since  1991.  5)  The average duration  of unemployment,
of  UA  payments  and  of  some  other  social  protection  payments  have  all  increased
substantially.  In recent years, the median duration of unemployment  as measured both in the
labor  force  survey  and  in  UA  beneficiary  data  has  hovered  around  one  year.  These
developments  should be  kept  in mind  as  the  experiences  of Australia's  UA  program  are
reviewed.
Table 2 displays annual fiscal year data on unemployment  and UA benefits. Between
1960  and  1974  the estimates  of total  unemployment  ranged  between  73,500  and  153,600
representing  from  1.6 percent to 2.7 percent of the labor  force. Since  1991,  in contrast,  the
annual  averages  have  ranged between  710,000  and  938,000,  and unemployment  rates  have
ranged from 7.7 percent to 11.0 percent.
During the years covered by Table 2, the number of UA beneficiaries has grown even
more  rapidly  than  unemployment.  Consequently  the  (NumBen/Unemp)  ratio,  which  had
ranged  from  0.15  to  0.38  between  1960  and  1974,  has exceeded  0.60  in  every  year since
1976 and has exceeded  1.00 in the years since  1995.  In a typical week during the most recent
five years there have been as many UA recipients as the number unemployed reported in the
labor force survey.
Data on UA recipients for recent years indicate that about 20 percent are working and
also receiving payments.  This suggests that about  80 percent of the unemployed as counted
in the labor  force  survey  receive  UA payments.  What  seems to  make  this possible  is the
strong negative  effect of long term unemployment  on family income. Among those with long
term unemployment,  it seems that family income is typically low enough to satisfy the means
test for UA  eligibility.  What  appears  to be a paradox,  i.e.,  most of the unemployed  collect
UA benefits  even though eligibility is means tested,  is apparently resolved by the fact that so
many of the unemployed are long-term.
Estimates of average weekly benefits and average weekly wages also appear in Table
2. UA benefit levels were raised substantially in the early 1970s. Average payments tripled
21Table 2. The Cost of Unemployment  Protection in Australia, 1959 to 1999
Fiscal  Labor  Unemp  U Rate  NumBen  NuniBen/ Total UA  Weekly  Weekly  Rep.  G  B%
Year  Force  TUR%  AnnAvg  Unemp  Benefits  Benefits  Wage  Rate
1959  12
1960  4109.5  68.0  1.7  9
1961  4198.5  88.5  2.1  9
1962  4282.0  116.0  2.7  30
1963  4381.0  104.0  2.4  39.7  0.382  21  10  41  0.254  0.097  0.230
1964  4524.5  85.0  1.9  25.9  0.305  13  10  43  0.234  0.071  0.134
1965  4715.0  73.5  1.6  13.7  0.187  7  10  46  0.208  0.039  0.061
1966  4851.5  77.0  1.6  14.9  0.194  8  10  48  0.210  0.041  0.065
1967  4962.2  90.8  1.8  20.7  0.227  11  10  51  0.204  0.046  0.085
1968  5084.1  95.4  1.9  21.5  0.226  11  10  54  0.186  0.042  0.079
1969  5204.6  92.8  1.8  17.8  0.192  9  10  58  0.173  0.033  0.059
1970  5379.0  93.7  1.7  13.2  0.141  9  13  63  0.206  0.029  0.051
1971  5563.3  97.1  1.7  15.0  0.154  11  14  69  0.200  0.031  0.054
1972  5666.5  126.6  2.2  29.1  0.230  26  17  76  0.225  0.052  0.115
1973  5834.1  153.6  2.6  39.6  0.258  47  23  83  0.272  0.070  0.185
1974  5990.3  127.3  2.1  34.1  0.268  58  33  96  0.341  0.091  0.194
1975  6103.1  247.1  4.0  116.6  0.472  252  42  120  0.345  0.163  0.659
1976  6230.9  301.6  4.8  191.7  0.636  514  52  138  0.375  0.238  1.152
1977  6290.6  325.1  5.2  216.9  0.667  618  55  155  0.354  0.236  1.221
1978  6400.9  389.6  6.1  265.8  0.682  794  57  170  0.338  0.231  1.405
1979  6464.9  408.7  6.3  306.2  0.749  910  57  183  0.313  0.234  1.481
1980  6600.7  407.6  6.2  306.3  0.752  925  58  200  0.290  0.218  1.345
1981  6757.1  395.9  5.9  310.0  0.783  996  62  227  0.272  0.213  1.247
1982  6863.4  423.5  6.2  332.0  0.784  1224  71  263  0.270  0.212  1.306
1983  6953.8  624.9  9.0  540.2  0.864  2249  80  292  0.274  0.237  2.130
1984  7067.6  680.1  9.6  619.6  0.911  2912  90  317  0.285  0.260  2.502
1985  7198.7  619.4  8.6  581.7  0.939  2984  99  338  0.291  0.274  2.355
1986  7451.4  591.5  7.9  559.2  0.946  3122  107  359  0.299  0.283  2.248
1987  7679.5  635.1  8.3  574.4  0.904  3454  116  381  0.304  0.275  2.272
1988  7866.8  610.5  7.8  502.5  0.823  3375  129  404  0.320  0.263  2.043
1989  8076.3  536.0  6.6  429.4  0.801  3136  140  431  0.326  0.261  1.732
1990  8346.3  515.3  6.2  385.0  0.747  3068  153  460  0.333  0.249  1.538
1991  8498.8  710.3  8.4  535.9  0.755  4561  164  487  0.336  0.254  2.121
1992  8526.0  882.0  10.3  771.4  0.875  6736  168  501  0.335  0.293  3.034
1993  8539.0  938.0  11.0  883.0  0.941  7492  163  511  0.319  0.301  3.302
1994  8672.0  916.8  10.6  905.7  0.988  7598  161  526  0.307  0.303  3.205
1995  8848.3  800.5  9.0  847.0  1.058  7061  160  544  0.295  0.312  2.819
1996  9084.3  768.5  8.5  812.8  1.058  5812  137  557  0.247  0.261  2.208
1997  9187.0  799.3  8.7  811.4  1.015  6207  147  574  0.256  0.260  2.267
1998  9228.0  766.8  8.3  794.0  1.036  5916  143  592  0.242  0.251  2.082
1999  9363.8  725.3  7.7  5771
Source: Department of Family and Community  Services (FaCS), Australian  Bureau of Statistics and OECD.
Labor force, unemployment and beneficiaries  in thousands. Total benefits in millions. Benefit data exclude
mature age  allowances from 1994 and payments to dependent partners after 1995. Estimates of the labor
force and unemployment for 1960-1964 based on OECD data. Beneficiaries  in  1994-98 estimated from a
regression of the annual average on the simple  average of June data for current and past fiscal year.
22between  1972 and 1976 and replacement rates increased.  Since the mid  1980s, the maximum
payment has  been indexed to the CPI with semi-annual  adjustments.  Prior to  1995,  weekly
benefits  also included an allowance  for dependent partners. Typically these allowances were
included in from one third to one half of payments to unemployed male UA beneficiaries.
Note in Table  2 that between  1986 and 1994 the estimated replacement  rates fall into
the 0.30-0.34 range.  As part of a reform  package  effective  in  1995,  payments  to dependent
partners  of unemployed  individuals  were  discontinued.  Note  that  the  replacement  rates
decline  after  1994  and  hover  around  0.25  from  1996  onward.  This  decrease  reflects  the
discontinuation  of payments  to  dependent  partners.  Between  June  30,  1994  and  June  30,
1995  the  number  of unemployed  recipients  decreased  by  about  75,000,  but payments  to
218,000  dependent partners  also ceased.  Thus the total recipients  paid  by the UA program
decreased  by  nearly  300,000.2'  Total  payments  of UA  benefits  declined  by  about  $1.25
billion between fiscal years 1995 and  1996.
Much of this decline  in payments  was merely  a relabeling phenomenon.  Dependent
spouses,  mainly women,  often were eligible to collect a partner  allowance where  eligibility
depended on the unemployed  spouse receiving UA benefits.
The change  in the treatment of dependent partners was part of a reform package  that
emphasized  increased  "individualization"  of benefit payments to the unemployed.  This will
be discussed in later paragraphs.
The final columns of Table 2 display estimates of G and B%. G, the generosity index,
fell below 0.10 in all years before  1975,  but has equaled or exceeded  0.25 in all years since
1984. Note that the index declined noticeably  after 1995, a change that parallels the decrease
in the  replacement  rate.22 Because  the  (NumBnen/Unemp)  ratio  has  hovered  around  1.0  in
recent years, however, this high ratio has prevented  G from declining to lower levels despite
the  reduction  in  the  replacement  rate.  Australia's  generosity  index  has  been  consistently
higher than the  average  for the  12  countries depicted  in Chart A even though it conditions
payments on income and assets.
21  These statements  about beneficiary  counts are based  on data not shown in Table 2. The beneficiary  counts in
Table 2 include just unemployed individuals, not dependent partners.
22  Again, much  of the change was more apparent than real  as spouse benefits often became partner allowances
with  little or no change in the amount paid to the family.
23The combination of high unemployment rates and a reasonably high generosity index
have  yielded  a  high  cost  of  unemployment  protection  in  Australia  in  recent  years.
Unemployment  benefits as a percent of wages (B%)  have averaged  2.37 percent  since  1983
and fell below two percent of wages in just three years (1989,  1990 and  1999 (not shown)).
This  cost rate  was  lower than  Canada's  for the  same period  (2.82  percent)  but more  than
three  times  the  U.S.  rate  (0.65  percent).  Operating  a  means  tested  UA  system  of
unemployment protection is not necessarily less expensive than a UI system.23
Chart E summarizes Australian experiences since  1963 by plotting benefit costs (B%)
against the unemployment rate.  The historical record falls into two periods,  the twelve years
from  1963  to 1974  and the years after  1974.24  The association between benefit costs and the
unemployment  rate  was  highly  significant  in regressions  fitted  for both  sub-periods.  Note
that the slope during  1975-1998  was twice the slope during 1963-1974  (0.309 versus 0.155).
The  larger  slope  reflects  both  the  higher  replacement  rate  and  the  higher  share  of the
unemployed  receiving  benefits  during  1975-1998.  The  regression  for these  later  years  also
indicates  that Australian  costs  exceeded  the  average  for  the twelve  countries  displayed  in
Chart A.
23A cost comparison between Australia and Canada should also  include costs of social assistance benefits paid
to the unemployed  in  Canada. Unfortunately  no  hard data on this was found.  Welfare  is administered  by the
provinces  in Canada and the provincial  systems are quite varied.  Many welfare  recipients  in Canada are able to
work but little is known about their former or current receipt of UI benefits.  See Barrett and Cragg for analysis
of welfare receipt  in British  Columbia. Including  social assistance to the unemployed  would make the Canada-
Australia differential  larger than suggested  in the text. For the U.S., social assistance  to the unemployed  is not
important so the Australia-U.S.  comparison is cleaner.
24  The  earlier of the  two periods  could  be  extended  backward  prior to  1963  with  outcomes  similar  to those
depicted  for  1963-1974.  For earlier  years,  however,  data limitations  become  more  serious.  The  labor  force
survey was  started  in  1960 but covered  only urban areas in early  years. There  are also problems  in measuring
the annual average number of beneficiaries  and the average weekly wage.
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If a country were to consider adopting an Australian-type  UA system how might it be
done  at  a  lower  cost?  Three  options  seem  pertinent.  1)  Have  payments  set  at  a  lower
percentage of average wages, e.g., 20 percent rather than the 25 percent shown for 1996-1998
in Table 2. 2) Eliminate (or sharply reduce) availability of benefits to the part-time employed.
3) Devote  more resources  to income  verification  activities.  The savings  from adopting  the
first  option  are  probably  the  easiest  to  estimate  accurately.  However,  the  importance  of
appropriate  income  verification  in  a  UA  program  (option  3)  makes  this  a  priority
consideration as well.
Local  circumstances  in  a  country  considering  the  establishment  of a  UA  system
would undoubtedly be crucial in structuring a new system.
VI.  The Cost of Unemployment  Assistance  in Four Countries
As noted  at the  start  of Section  V,  Australia  is  one  of four  countries  that rely  on
income-conditioned  unemployment  assistance  (UA) benefits  to compensate  the unemployed.
25The other three are New  Zealand,  Hong Kong and  Estonia.25 Of the four,  Australia has the
largest  population,  roughly  18  million persons,  whereas  the  combined  populations  of the
other three sum to about  11  million.
Although this paper  focuses most attention  on Australia,  it is instructive to examine
the cost of unemployment  protection for all four  countries.  As with UI systems,  these four
UA systems exhibit highly varied costs. Australia  and New Zealand operate  programs with
reasonably  high costs while Hong Kong and Estonia have low cost systems.  The latter two
achieve  low  costs  by  compensating  a  low  proportion  of the  unemployed.  Additionally,
Estonia makes very low payments to beneficiaries.
While program details vary across these countries, all four systems pay flat benefits to
unemployed persons who satisfy a means test with additional payments for dependents.  The
presence of dependents in New Zealand  and Hong Kong raises the level of the UA payment
whereas  in Estonia  having  a dependent  lengthens  the  maximum  duration of benefits.  The
New  Zealand  system  is  like  Australia's  in  that  some  beneficiaries  are  only  partially
unemployed.  Hong Kong  compensates  the  partially  unemployed with a separate  assistance
payment for those low earnings.26
Table 3 provides summary information on the four UA programs.  The left-hand  side
shows  summaries  for  four  decades  starting  with the  1960s while the right-hand  side  gives
details  for  individual  years  during  the  1990s.  Panel  A  displays  unemployment  rates.  An
upward trend by decade  is obvious for both Australia and New Zealand  as is Hong Kong's
generally lower unemployment rate.  The increase  in Estonia between  1991  and  1995  is also
apparent.
The recipiency  proportions  in Panel  B  show vivid  contrasts.  During  the  1980s  and
1990s the proportions in Australia  and New Zealand have exceeded  0.75 during most years,
and for both countries  proportions  have exceeded  1.0 in several years.  During the 1990s the
recipiency  proportion  in New Zealand  has been  considerably  higher  than in Australia,  i.e.,
decade averages of 1.12 and 0.94 respectively.
25  The four countries were identified  from a review of U.S. Social  Security Administration (1999).
26  In recent years the number of  recipients of low earnings allowances has averaged from one fifth to one fourth
of UA recipients.
26Table 3. Cost of Unemployment  Protection in Four Countries with Unemployment  Assistance
1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Panel  A. Unemployment  Rate -Percent of Labor Force
Australia  1.9  3.7  7.6  8.9  6.2  8.4  10.3  11.0  10.6  9.0  8.5  8.7  8.3  7.7
NewZealand  0.2  0.5  4.2  8.0  7.1  9.1  10.6  10.0  9.0  7.0  6.1  6.4  7.1  7.3
Hong Kong - a  - 3.5  3.0  2.5  1.2  1.5  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.5  3.2  2.4  3.0  5.9
Estonia- b  - - - 7.8  - 1.5  3.7  6.5  7.6  9.7  10.0  9.7  9.9  11.7
Panel B.  Unemployment  Assistance  Beneficiaries as a Proportion of the Unemployed
Australia - c  0.24  0.43  0.85  0.94  0.75  0.76  0.88  0.94  0.99  1.06  1.06  1.02  1.04
NewZealand-d  0.39  0.83  0.78  1.12  1.16  1.00  0.94  1.03  1.09  1.23  1.26  1.18  1.12  1.14
Hong Kong-  e  - - 0.04  0.08  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.17  0.17  0.13
Estonia-  f  - - - 0.26  - - - - 0.30  0.20  0.24  0.26  0.25  0.31
Panel C. Replacement  Rate, Average Benefits  as a Proportion of Average Wages
Australia - c  0.21  0.30  0.29  0.30  0.33  0.34  0.34  0.32  0.31  0.30  0.25  0.26  0.24
New Zealand - d  0.41  0.54  0.40  0.32  0.36  0.35  0.32  0.24  0.32  0.30  0.31  0.32  0.32
Hong Kong- e  - - 0.34  0.41  0.29  0.28  0.29  0.29  0.39  0.43  0.47  0.51  0.52  0.58
Estonia -f  - - - 0.10  - - - 0.17  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.09
Panel  D. Generosity  Index -G = Proportion Compensated *  Replacement Rate
Australia -c  0.053  0.138  0.250  0.276  0.249  0.254  0.293  0.301  0.303  0.312  0.261  0.260  0.251
NewZealand  -d  0.172  0.446  0.312  0.351  0.419  0.350  0.300  0.246  0.348  0.370  0.389  0.376  0.356
HongKong-e  - - 0.014  0.039  0.015  0.011  0.011  0.014  0.024  0.026  0.036  0.086  0.090  0.074
Estonia- f  - - - 0.022  - - - - 0.032  0.015  0.019  0.018  0.018  0.028
Panel E. Unemployment  Benefits  as a Percent of Wages - B%
Australia-c  0.10  0.65  1.92  2.51  1.54  2.12  3.03  3.30  3.20  2.82  2.21  2.27  2.08
NewZealand-d  0.07  0.17  1.34  2.76  2.99  3.17  3.17  2.48  3.12  2.59  2.38  2.39  2.52
HongKong-e  - - 0.03  0.12  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.12  0.20  0.27  0.44
Estonia-  f  - - - 0.21  - - - - 0.24  0.15  0.19  0.17  0.17  0.32
Source: Australia -Table 2; New Zealand -Arnual Yearbook, various issues; Hong Kong - Census and Statistics Department; Estonia -
Table 2 and  10 of Vodopivec,  Worgotter and Raju (2001).  Selected data adjustments made by the author. Fiscal year data for
Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong.  a - from 1977, b - from  1991,  c - from  1963, d -from  1966, e -from  1986, f - from
1993  or 1994 as indicated.
Observe  that  recipiency  rates  are  much  lower  in  Hong  Kong  and  Estonia.  Their
highest recipiency proportions during the  1990s were 0.17  and 0.31  respectively.  The decade
27 averages  for the 1990s were  0.08 for Honk Kong and  0.26  for Estonia.  Note also that the
recipiency proportion did increase toward the end of the  1  990s in Hong Kong while no trend
is apparent in Estonia.
Panel  C  shows that average  replacement  rates  in Australia  and New Zealand  were
similar  during  the  1990s  at  0.30  and 0.32  respectively.  In prior decades  New Zealand had
higher  replacement  rates,  averages  of 0.41,  0.54  and  0.40.  Hong  Kong  had  an  average
27  The recipiency rate  in Hong Kong is increased  only modestly  when payments  to families with low earnings
are also counted. The average  for the 1990s was 0. 11,  only modestly higher than the 0.08 shown in Table 3.
27replacement  rate of 0.41  during the  1990s, and it clearly was much higher from  1994 than in
earlier years.
Replacement  rates in Estonia are consistently low in all years from  1993.  The decade
average  was 0.10, and between  1994  and 1999 annual replacement  rates varied in the narrow
range  between  0.07  and  0.10.  With  such  low  replacement  rates  it  seems  clear  the  UA
recipients  in Estonia experience  serious  income reductions  and economic  hardship  while in
receipt of these payments.
Panel D shows generosity indices  for the four countries.  Australia and New Zealand
with average  indices of 0.276 and  0.351  for the  1990s  would be above-average  if included
with the  group  of  12  OECD  countries  previously  examined  in Chart  A.  Hong  Kong  and
Estonia, in contrast, would lie towards  the very bottom of Chart A. Their average generosity
indices for the 1990s were 0.039 and 0.022. These would be most similar to that of Greece in
Chart A (0.032)  and less than half of the indices for Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S., the other
three countries with low generosity indices in Chart A.
For  Hong  Kong note  that  the  generosity  index  increased  during  the  1990s,  and  it
averaged  0.083  during  1997-1999.  The  increase  reflects  increases  in both  the  recipiency
proportion and the replacement rate. Both were much higher during 1997-1999 than earlier in
the decade.  For these three years the generosity index in Hong Kong was only slightly lower
than the indices for Portugal, the U.K and the U.S. in Chart A.
Panel E translates the combined effects of unemployment rates and generosity indices
into  costs  as  a  percent  of total  wages.  For  Australia  and  New  Zealand  unemployment
protection  costs  averaged  respectively  2.51  and  2.76  percent  of wages  during  the  1990s.
These  cost rates  for  both countries  stand  in  sharp  contrast  to the  1960s  when the  decade
averages were 0.10 and 0.07 percent of wages.
For  Hong  Kong  and  Estonia,  the  costs  of unemployment  protection  respectively
averaged 0.12 and 0.21  percent of wages during the  1990s.  Both averages  were less than on
tenth  of  the  averages  for  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  The  low  costs  in  Estonia  seem
especially surprising given the high average unemployment rate of 7.8 percent for the
28decade.  For Hong  Kong,  costs  as a percent  of wages  increased  sharply after  1994.  Three
factors  contributed to the increase:  an increase  in the unemployment rate, an increase in the
proportion compensated  and an increase in the replacement  rate. All three were much higher
in 1999 than in 1990.
The principal  conclusion  of this section  is  straightforward.  A country that provides
unemployment protection  using income-conditioned  UA payments may experience  high or
low  or intermediate  costs.  Means  testing per-se  does not ensure  that  a UA  system  will  be
inexpensive.  For  both  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  recipiency  rates  are  very  high  while
replacement  rates  are  not especially  high.  However,  their recent  cost experiences  are  not
unusual when placed within the wider context of OECD countries.
For  both Hong Kong  and  Estonia,  UA  system  costs  are  low.  Estonia  achieves  low
costs through a combination of a low recipiency rate and a low replacement  rate. Hong Kong
also has a low recipiency rate, but its replacement  rate is actually quite high. Towards the end
of the  1990s  the  cost  of unemployment  protection  increased  sharply  in  Hong  Kong  as
unemployment  increased,  the recipiency  rate  increased  and  the replacement  rate  increased.
Despite increases  in all three factors, unemployment protection in Hong Kong still fell below
0.5 percent of wages in 1999.
This analysis  did not  explore  the  institutional  reasons  that  cause  low  UA costs  in
Hong Kong and Estonia versus  high costs in Australia and New Zealand.  However the next
section  returns  the  focus  to  Australia  to  review  disincentive  issues  and the  evolution  of
policy.
The final  conclusion  of this section is that UI and UA as systems  of unemployment
protection may experience high costs, low costs or intermediate costs. It is not necessarily the
case that UA systems are less expensive than UI systems.
VII.  Disincentives  and Policy Changes in Australia
Disincentives  and  the  phenomenon  of long  duration  in  benefit  status  have  been
recognized  as problems  in Australia for many years.  Several changes in the terms of benefit
eligibility have been made but problems persist.
29Structure of  the benefit phase-out
The  earliest  form of the  means  test on family  income  featured  a  dollar  for dollar
reduction  in  benefits  when  family  income  exceeded  the  guarantee  threshold.  For  age
pensions,  this was modified  in  1969 with  the introduction  of a  tapered  means  test coupled
vvith a free  area. 28 Some earnings were allowed with no reduction in pensions (the free area)
followed by a 50 percent  reduction rate when earnings  exceeded the amount allowed by the
free area.  Subsequent  modifications over the next decade widened  the free area,  eliminated
the test for those 75  and older, then for those 70-74 and then eliminated the asset element of
the means  test.29 Most of the latter changes were  reversed  between  1978 and  1985, but key
features  were  retained,  e.g.,  a  free  area  and  a  phase-out  with  an  effective  tax  (benefit
reduction) rate of 50 percent.
Means  testing of UA  benefits  followed  a similar history but with changes  occurring
later. The dollar-for-dollar benefit reduction was in place through  1979. The free area and the
50  percent  reduction  followed  by  a  100  percent  reduction  were  introduced  in  1980  and
several  more modifications  occurred  between  1982 and  1994.30  Throughout  this period  the
UA income test was based on family income.
Major  changes  were  then  instituted  in  1995.  1) The  basis  of entitlement  to  UA
benefits was changed  from family income to individual income (each person's earnings plus
their share of other countable income).  2) Payments to dependent partners of the unemployed
were  ended,  but replaced  by partner  allowances  in most situations.  3)  The range of the  100
percent  phase-out was replaced  with a 70 percent phase-out  range  (while  the free zone  and
the  50 percent phase-out  were  retained,  although  the  size of the  free  zone  was  reduced  ).
Thus  as  benefits  were  being  reduced  due  to  increased  earnings,  the  phase-out  was
restructured  so that income (earnings plus UA benefits) would always be higher as a result of
higher earnings.
The  change  to  "individualization"  was  made  in  order  to  improve  incentives  for
combining  work  with receipt  of UA  benefits,  particularly  among  women who  often work
28 While there is  an assets  test, it is  applied to restrict payments relatively infrequently, in situations where there
are high assets but low income.  See footnote 4 in Whiteford (2000).
29  One  description of these developments is given in Section 2.4 in Whiteford (2000).
30 A concise description  of these changes is given in Section 2.1 and Table 2.1 in Warburton,  et.al.  (1999).
30part-time.  Previously,  working  women  were  frequently precluded  from UA  benefits  while
unemployed  due to earnings  and other income of their spouse. While it became more likely
that an unemployed  wife could now collect UA benefits,  individualization did not mean that
husbands'  earnings became  irrelevant in eligibility determinations.  Husbands'  earnings equal
to  or exceeding  60-62 percent  of national  average  earnings would preclude  an unemployed
wife from eligibility.3'  The net effect of the change in many situations was to allow receipt of
UA  benefits  and  to  encourage  part-time  work  (due  to  the  lower,  70  percent,  phase-out),
particularly at higher levels of earnings.  One analysis using data for the two and a half years
following  the  changeover  suggested  this  effect  did  take  place.  (Chapters  4,  5  and  6  of
Warburton,  et.al., (1999)).
Means testing  pension benefits
Illustrative of incentive  problems in Australia's  means tested system is the imperfect
interface  between  publicly  provided  pension benefits  and  superannuation  benefits.  Pension
benefits  continue  to  be  means  tested.  Other  pension  reforms  will  gradually  raise  the
retirement  age,  but the applicable  ages for eligibility currently differ  (and will  continue  to
differ) between pension  benefits and  superannuation  benefits which can be accessed  earlier.
As a result, people have been withdrawing  superannuation  amounts as  lump sums  with the
effect  of lowering  countable  income  in  later  years  when  public  pension  entitlements  are
calculated.  Legislative  and  administrative  actions  have  been  undertaken  to  address  this
problem, but occurrences are common. An example of an
unanticipated  use  of superannuation  lump  sums  is  removing  monies  to  finance  current
consumption activities such as foreign vacations.
Research  has not reached a consensus  on the size of this phenomenon  or what share
of early lump sum withdrawals  are going to pre-retirement consumption.  There is consensus
that a problem exists and policy actions have occurred.  Specific  actions to "tighten up" have
included raising the minimum age  for withdrawals  (the preservation age), basing  the test for
severe  financial  hardship  (a permissible  reason  for  early  withdrawals)  on  more  objective
criteria and enacting  stricter requirements  for the preservation of future  contributions.  There
31  The  threshold  on  spouses'  allowable  weekly  earnings  in August  1999  was roughly  $500 compared  to a
national average for full-time workers of about $800.
31have  also  been proposals  to limit the  form of withdrawals  to annuities,  i.e.,  not permitting
lump sum withdrawals.32
Early withdrawal of superannuation monies partially subverts  an original rationale for
establishing  superannuation  accounts.  A  major  purpose  was  to  reduce  expenditures  on
government  pensions  in the  long run as superannuation  annuities  would be part of income
counted  against  pension entitlements.  If superannuation assets are  dissipated early, long run
savings on pension outlays  are  reduced.  This problem is illustrative  of behavioral  responses
that can occur in a payment  system that conditions  eligibility on income.  To the extent that
clients can control the timing of their income,  their behavior can offset the intended effect of
the policy.33
A  similar  problem  exists  in  administration  of UA  payments  to  the  unemployed.
Individuals  can  reduce  earnings  by "appearing"  to  be  unemployed.  Lower  income  raises
income-conditioned  entitlements.  Hence,  it is important to monitor recipients to ensure that
work search activities represent good faith efforts to secure reemployment.
Job search and  mutual obligation
Australia  has  undertaken  a  variety  of  initiatives  to  promote  activation  among
beneficiaries  of pensions  and allowances  and  specifically  among  the  unemployed.  Mutual
obligation is the tern  used to describe  situations where the recipient's right to cash payments
(or  other  support)  is  acknowledged,  but  the  receipt  of payments  is  conditioned  on  the
discharge a reciprocal  obligation. Registration  with the employment  service and engaging  in
active job search are two obligations placed on the unemployed.
The  scope  of activities  falling  under  mutual  obligation  is  now  quite  wide,  and  it
differs  according  to the  type of benefit  or  allowance  being  received.  Persons  in receipt  of
benefits  may  (depending  on the  type  of payment):  search  for  work,  undertake  training,  do
unpaid  community  work,  care for the young,  engage  in physical rehabilitation  or undertake
life skills training.
32 See Chapter 6 and especially  Section 6.2 in Ingles (1998).
33  Ross  (1997)  has  observed  that the means  test of the public  pension  system  discourages  savings  while  the
superannuation  system is intended to encourage savings for retirement.  Permitting lump sum withdrawals works
against the intent of the superannuation system.
32For  the unemployed,  there  have  been  several  changes  in the  administration  of the
work  search  requirement.  There  has  been  a continuing  requirement  that the  UA  recipient
must  be  unemployed  (able  to  work,  available  for  work  and  actively  seeking  work)  and
registered as ajob seeker.
Until  1982  the  agency with primary  day-to-day  responsibility  for administering the
work  test  was  the  Commonwealth  Employment  Service  (CES).  The  CES,  part  of the
Employment  Department,  acted  as  an agent  for the  Department  of Social  Security  (DSS)
which  administered  the  payment  of  UA  cash  benefits.  In  1982  DSS  assumed  direct
responsibility  for  work  test  administration.  Responsibility  was  returned  to  CES  in  1991
though DSS had a partial role in 1993-1994.
Reforms  of 1995 altered the  administrative  structure  for the delivery of benefits and
services  to  the  unemployed.  A  new  administrative  entity,  Centrelink,  was  established  in
December  1996  to deliver of social security  entitlements.  Centrelink was also to perform a
gateway  function  for the unemployed,  i.e.,  registering  people as unemployed  and assessing
their degree of labor market disadvantage.  Other labor market services previously discharged
by  CES  such  as  job  matching  and  case  management  became  the  responsibility  of Job
Network,  a  semi-privatized  "market"  with  government,  non-profit  and  for-profit
organizations  competing  to  provide  employment  services.34 Registration  and  job  search
continue to be required within this revised service delivery structure.
The approach to "activate" the unemployed  has also undergone several modifications.
Prior to the large increase in unemployment of the mid 1  970s, emphasis
was placed  mainly on the  acceptance  of suitable  work.  During these  years,  the number  of
vacancies listed with the CES represented  some one third to one half of UA registrants. Thus
CES  could  offer  jobs  to  a  meaningful  share  of  registrants.  This  changed  when
unemployment-vacancy  ratios moved  from  roughly  2.0  upwards  to 20.0  and higher  in the
mid  1970s.  In line  with this development,  there  were  changes  in the definition  of suitable
work  which  could be  refused  while  retaining  an  entitlement  to  benefits.  Guidelines  were
broadened  in  1976  to  require  (after  12  weeks)  acceptance  of work  in  line with  local job
34  In  October  1998  the  Department  of  Family  and  Community  Services  (FaCS,  the  entity  that  subsumed
functions  previously  discharged  by  the  Department  of  Health  and  Family  Services)  was  created.  Its
responsibilities  included child care,  disability and housing programs,  i.e., benefits and services to families.
33availability even if it meant a reduction  in wages and/or  status. By 1989,  this definition  had
been further modified to require acceptance  of casual, part-time or temporary work.35
Work search requirements also have become more formal with increased emphasis on
evidence  of active  search.  Changes  effective  in  1991  required  both the  short-term  and the
long-term  unemployed  to  satisfy  an  activity test.  For those  unemployed  less  than  twelve
months  (receiving  a payment  termed  a  Job  Search  Allowance)  the  activity  test  included
active  work  search  or participation  in labor  market  or vocational  training  approved  by the
Department  of  Employment,  Education  and  Training  (DEET)  as  likely  to  improve  job
prospects  or the  effectiveness  of job  search.  For the  long  term  unemployed  (12  or more
months in benefit status, payments termed a Newstart Allowance) there was a requirement to
participate  in  an  activity  agreement  intended  to  secure  reemployment  but  tailored  to
individual circumstances.  Several possible activities were to be considered,  e.g., work search
activity  acceptable  for the  Job  Search  recipients  plus  other  activities  including  paid  work
experience  and activities proposed by the person,  e.g., unpaid volunteer work.  One intention
of this change was to reallocate CES administrative resources to target the long-term segment
of the unemployment pool.
Further changes in the activity test became effective in 1995. Increased emphasis was
placed on early identification of likely long term UA recipients.  The attempt to identify long
term  recipients  was  perhaps  influenced  by new  administrative  practices  in  the  U.S.  that
"profile"  likely  UI exhaustees.  Also, a wider range  of acceptable  search activities  could be
considered.  These  changes  have not had a noticeable  effect on measured  duration which,  if
anything, has been higher since their implementation.36
Older  unemployed  workers  have  generally  not faced  the  activity  test requirements
applied  to  younger  workers.  Those  aged  at  least  50  but  younger  than  retirement  age
frequently  have been  exempted  from active  search and have been allowed  a wider range of
acceptable  alternatives  to  searching  for  paid  work.  The  mature  age  allowance,  paid since
1995,  goes  to  dislocated  workers  aged  60 and  older and  effectively  functions  as  an  early
retirement benefit. Older workers consistently exhibit the longest average durations of all age
35 This evolution prior to 1995  is described in Chapter 7 of Department of Social Security  (1995)
36  Medians computed by the author based on data for June  30'  averaged from 7.9 to 8.9 months between  1992
and 1996, but increased to  11.9 months in  1997 and to 14.0 months in 1998.
34groups.  In recent  years,  percentages  as high as 40 percent  of older workers  who  leave UA
benefit status have exited to become recipients  of invalidity (disability) pensions.  Relative to
UA benefits, these payments  have higher guarantees  and carry no  obligation for active job
search.  In  1995,  disability pensions were  received by  15  percent  of men aged  55-59 and by
25 percent of men aged 60-64.
Looking  back  over the past thirty years,  it seems that  activation  has not been very
successful  in Australia, at least as reflected in macro labor market indicators. Unemployment
duration  (in  both the  labor force  survey  and  in UA beneficiary  data)  remained  stubbornly
high  during  the  economic  recoveries  of the  1980s  and  the  1990s.  While  the  goal  of the
changes in the activity test has been to speed the movement of people from unemployment to
employment, achievement of the goal has proved elusive.
Consumption smoothing
The  structure  of the means  test on income  ensures  that effective  marginal  tax  rates
(EMTRs)  on earnings will be high for those  with earnings that exceed the free  area.  There
have been several Australian studies of EMTRs that  confirm this observation. Thus most of
added  earnings  above  the  free  area  (typically  60  to  90  percent)  is  offset  by UA  benefit
reductions  (and  increased  income  taxes).  Two  recent  analyses  of  EMTRs  are  given  in
Appendix  4 of Interim  Report  of the  Reference  Group  on Welfare  Reform  (2000)  and  in
Section  2.4  in Whiteford  (2000).  These  emphasize  the  combined  effects  of phase-outs  of
income-conditioned transfers  and phase-ins of taxes occurring  at different income levels and
even causing notches, i.e., areas where EMTRs exceed 100 percent.
The phenomenon of high EMTRs is a direct consequence of the basic structure of the
income  test on  benefit payments  with a  50  percent  (then  a  70 percent)  phase-out  above  a
modest free area. While this structure for the means test ensures a high degree of targeting to
those  with  low  income,  it  also  (through  high  EMTRs)  produces  substitution  effects  that
operate against increased labor supply among those with low income.
High  EMTRs  also  imply  that  when  income  falls  due  to  unemployment,  those
receiving  UA payments  will  typically  experience  high replacement  of lost earnings.  The
high replacement  rates provided by UA in Australia imply that the program accomplishes  a
high degree  of consumption  smoothing.  With  replacement  rates that typically  fall  into the
350.60-0.90  range,  many  workers  experiencing  unemployment  are  able  to  maintain
consumption  spending  at quite  high levels.  Given  the structure  of earnings  by gender,  age
and skill,  the effective  degree of income replacement  is undoubtedly  higher on average  for
young workers, women and those with low skills,  groups that typically  have below-average
wages and earnings.  Illustrative  replacement  rates reported  in Table 4.1  and Figures  4.3  and
4.4  in Appendix  4 of Interim  Report  of the  Reference  Group  on Welfare  Reform  (2000)
vividly demonstrate this point.
Summary
Analyses  of programs  intended  to  provide  income  support  and/or  reduce  poverty
identify three objectives in structuring benefit payments,  objectives that to some extent are in
conflict with each other:  1) a high degree of targeting,  i.e., making payments  mainly to those
who are poor, 2) low total budget costs and 3) having good labor market incentives. Of these
three objectives, the Australian system of means testing does well on two:  1) most monies are
directed towards the bottom of the income distribution and 2) budget costs are kept relatively
low due to the high phase-out of benefits  as income rises.  However,  for the third objective,
i.e., good  labor  supply incentives,  it has  serious problems.  To address  the problems  within
the existing, i.e., means tested,  structure would be expensive  since it would require  reducing
the  taper  rate  (reducing  EMTRs),  but this  would  move  entitlements  much  further  up  the
income distribution and yield a much more expensive system of social protection.
One element of public discussions in Australia is to consider an earnings supplement
like an Earned  Income  Tax Credit (EITC)  as  in United  States  or some other form of wage
subsidy for those with low wage rates and/or hours. The attractive feature of an EITC is that
is raises the marginal reward to work at low hours rather than reducing it as under the present
free area cum taper  rate  in Australia.  In effect, the EITC over the lowest range of earnings
causes the substitution effect to induce greater hours of work, not fewer hours as at present.
In a world where  there  are no  free  lunches,  however,  such a  change,  if implemented  on  a
scale  sufficient  to induce  changes  in behavior,  would  also  have macro  budget  implications
that would need to be considered.  Since Australia has a long tradition of  reliance on income-
conditioning  to  structure  social protection  payments,  there  could  be wide receptivity  to  an
EITC proposal.
36VIII.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  compared  UI  and  UA  as  alternative  programs  for  providing
compensation  to  the  unemployed.  The  comparison  has  not been  comprehensive,  focusing
mainly on the cost of benefits and labor market disincentives.  Much of the discussion of UA
has drawn upon the experiences of one country,  Australia.
Three  areas  important  for  a  comprehensive  comparison  of UI  with  UA  were  not
addressed in detail.  1) The comparative  costs of program  administration were not examined.
Typically  these costs are  incurred at more than one  administrative  entity and  at each entity
costs  of unemployment  benefits  administration  are  but  one  component  of organizational
costs.  As noted  in Section  VII,  the day-to-day  administration  of UA in Australia  is shared
between  Centrelink  (benefit  payments  administration)  and  Job  Network  (job  search  and
reemployment  administration)  under  the overall  aegis of FaCS.  The administrative  costs of
these activities were not estimated.  2) The degree of consumption  smoothing provided by UA
was  not  investigated  in  detail.  Instead,  inferences  were  drawn  in  Section  VII  based  on
analyses of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs).  Typically, replacement  rates are quite high
in Australia, i.e., falling into the 0.60-0.90 range. Based on these estimated replacement rates,
the  degree  of consumption  smoothing  in  Australia  is  much  higher  than  in  the  U.S.  and
probably higher than in Canada.  The degree of consumption smoothing in the other three UA
countries  was  not  explicitly  addressed  although  it  is  clear  that  very  little  consumption
smoothing takes place in Estonia.  3) No attention was given to issues of program financing,
for  either UI  or UA.  The operational  assumption  for the  paper has  been that issues  on the
benefit  side of UI and  UA programs  can be addressed  without the need to address  funding
issues.  Note  that  the most  generous  UI  program  examined  here (Sweden)  relies  primarily
appropriations  from  the  general  budget  which is also  the  funding  source  for the  two  most
generous  UA  programs  (Australia  and  New  Zealand).  However  three  other  generous  UI
systems are financed mainly by payroll taxes (Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands).
Perhaps the most interesting finding of the paper relates to UA program costs. Section
VI examined  cost data from the four countries where UA  is the primary income support for
the unemployed.  Two of the four  countries,  Australia  and New Zealand,  have  had costs in
recent years that can be described as somewhat above-average  when compared to the costs of
37UI programs  for a sample of 12 OECD countries. The other two UA systems, in Hong Kong
and Estonia, have exhibited  costs similar to the costs of the lowest-cost  UI system examined
here (Greece).
Thus the conclusion  about comparative  costs of UA versus UI  is "it depends."  One
would  need  to  specify  exact  statutory  and  administrative  provisions  of the  UA  and  UI
system  being  compared  before  making  inferences  about  their  comparative  costs.  A
comparison between  UA in Australia and UI in Canada suggests the Australian  is the more
expensive of the two systems.  Compared to the U.S.,  a low cost UI  system, Australia's UA
program  is  roughly  three  times  more  expensive  per  percentage  point  of unemployment.
However,  the  costs of Hong  Kong's UA  system  per percentage  point of unemployment  is
below that of eleven of the twelve UI systems included in Chart A.
The  finding  that  UA  has  high  costs  in  Australia  points  to  a  seeming  paradox.
Australia  conditions  eligibility on  income  but  still  most of the unemployed,  especially  the
long term unemployed,  receive UA benefits.  While the level of support payments is modest
(about one fourth of the average weekly wage), many recipients  experience long term periods
in  benefit  status.  A  lower  income  guarantee  probably  would  result  in  shorter  spells  of
unemployment.  Two  factors  could  be  contributing  to  this  outcome.  1)  A  number  of
Australians could be prolonging their spells of unemployment to satisfy the income eligibility
conditions  for  UA.  This  could  suggest  there  is  a  degree  of control  over  unemployment
duration  for  at  least  some  recipients  (moral  hazard).  2)  Some  claimants  may  be  able  to
misrepresent their income levels in order to satisfy UA income eligibility criteria.  This could
suggest  that  FaCS  needs  to  invest  more  administrative  resources  in  income  verification
activities.  Both  factors  could  be  contributing  to  a  situation  where  the  number  of  fully
unemployed  UA  recipients  represents  about  80  percent  of  all  persons  measured  as
unemployed in the Australian labor force survey.
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